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THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, LEGAL PA-
PERS, VOLUME 3: THE FEDERAL PRACI'ICE. An-
drew J. King 1 editor. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of 
New England. 1989. Pp. xxxi, 1098. $110.00. 
James W. Ely, Jr. 2 
Daniel Webster's long and distinguished legal career has been 
chronicled by numerous scholars.3 Appearing before the Supreme 
Court in about two hundred cases, Webster did much to shape con-
stitutional thought in the antebellum era. Few would dispute Web-
ster's place among the foremost legal advocates in American 
history. 
Ably edited by Professor Andrew J. King, The Papers of 
Daniel Webster: The Federal Practice offers a new perspective on 
Webster's achievements. Encompassing both private and constitu-
tional litigation, this volume contains a wealth of material concern-
ing Webster's participation in federal litigation between his first 
Supreme Court argument in an 1814 prize case and his last case 
shortly before his death in 1852. To illustrate Webster's career 
King has assembled an impressive array of judicial arguments, cor-
respondence, pleadings, notes on the arguments of opposing coun-
sel, opinion letters, and legislative reports. These materials are 
arranged topically into chapters concerning Webster's participation 
in major cases or discrete fields of law, and chronologically within 
each chapter. Insightful editorial notes help readers to understand 
the documents in historical context. The volume, published in two 
parts, includes extensive treatment of Webster's role in such 
landmark decisions as Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), Gib-
bons v. Ogden (1824), and Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge 
(1837). But the work also provides a valuable study of Webster's 
wide-ranging private law practice, covering maritime litigation, pat-
ent infringement cases, disputes over waterpower, and land title 
controversies. Helpful appendices catalogue each of Webster's ap-
pearances before the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. 
Webster's constitutional advocacy surely interests the widest 
range of scholars today. Property rights were central to Webster's 
constitutionalism. Although influenced by tactical considerations 
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in particular cases, he consistently championed the rights of prop-
erty owners against legislative control. Mirroring the values of the 
framers, Webster linked political liberty and protection of private 
property. "(N]ext to life, & liberty," he observed in his Dartmouth 
College brief, "the great end of free government is to keep hands off 
private property." 
Along with his high regard for property rights, Webster har-
bored deep suspicion of state legislatures. "If at this period there is 
not a general restraint on legislatures, in favour of private rights," 
he argued in an 1829 land title dispute, "there is an end to private 
property." As this argument suggests, Webster's nationalism was 
largely instrumental: He endeavored to strengthen national power 
as a shield against state infringement of property rights. More spe-
cifically, Webster successfully sought to fashion the contract clause 
and the commerce clause into significant limits on state power over 
economic affairs. 
Webster was especially well-attuned to the property-conscious 
Marshall Court. He was clearly less comfortable with the Jackso-
nian bent of the Court once Roger B. Taney became Chief Justice in 
1836. "The present Judges, I fear," Webster complained in 1847, 
"are quite too much inclined to find apologies for irregular & dan-
gerous acts of State Legislative." Notwithstanding this foreboding, 
he continued to enjoy influence before the high court. For instance, 
Webster successfully urged upon the Taney Court a broad view of 
federal admiralty jurisdiction over maritime contracts of carriage. 
Aside from such weighty constitutional issues, the volume 
casts revealing light on the more practical aspects of Webster's fed-
eral court practice. The documents show him formulating litigation 
strategy, handling clients, commenting on the arguments of oppos-
ing counsel, and offering his appraisal of various justices. Webster 
frequently represented commercial interests and corporations. Fol-
lowing his success in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), he represented 
the second Bank of the United States during the 1820s. He served 
as counsel for several railroads in Massachusetts, as well as the Bos-
ton Manufacturing Company. Likewise, insurance companies 
turned to Webster for legal advice. 
Particularly welcome is this book's attention to Webster's pri-
vate law practice. This aspect of his career is often obscured by the 
more famous constitutional cases. Technology was a driving force 
in the transformation of American society during the 19th century. 
In sympathy with this technological revolution, Webster viewed 
patent protection as a means of inducing investment and encourag-
ing inventions. Consequently, he frequently sought to enforce pat-
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ents in the lower federal courts in New England. Webster was also 
active in disputes over land ownership and inheritance rights, argu-
ing many such cases before the Supreme Court under diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction. 
The financial dimensions of practice were never far from Web-
ster's mind. From his early request of a $1000 fee in Dartmouth 
College, Webster was never modest in estimating his value. He fre-
quently negotiated with clients concerning fees, and occasionally ex-
perienced difficulty collecting his compensation. Webster pressed 
vigorously in 1827 to receive payment for his services in a case to 
recover a lottery prize. In view of the complexity of the Passenger 
Cases (1849), Webster suggested that "an enlarged contingency" 
would be in order. Indeed, he subsequently entered into a contin-
gency fee arrangement under which he received 25% of any tax 
rebates received by his clients. Little wonder that one aggravated 
client observed: "Webster like all the Lawyers is unreasonable in 
relation to Money Matters." 
Despite a large measure of self-confidence, Webster did not al-
low his role as an advocate to distort his assessment of the likely 
outcome of cases. Pessimistic about the prospect of success in 
Charles River Bridge, Webster urged his client to consider a negoti-
ated settlement. Although he attacked state liquor regulations in 
the License Cases ( 184 7), he correctly predicted that the Supreme 
Court would uphold the laws. 
Webster enjoyed informal access to several Supreme Court jus-
tices. He corresponded regularly with Joseph Story on matters of 
general legal interest as well as legislation pending in Congress. At 
times this correspondence touched upon national events. While 
Webster was Secretary of State, for instance, Story strongly recom-
mended that Webster push President John Tyler to take steps 
against the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island. R. Kent Newmyer has 
characterized this close collaboration between Webster and Story 
"as one of the most extraordinary in American law and politics."4 
Even more remarkably, Webster wrote John McLean requesting in-
formation about the outcome of the Passenger Cases. Breaching ju-
dicial confidentiality, McLean gave private assurances that "there 
will be a right decision." This exchange, highly questionable to 
modem eyes, reflects the casual standards of a less fastidious age. 
The volume also documents the close relationship between 
Webster's legal practice and his political career. As chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee during the 1820s Webster worked to 
4. R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE 
OLD REPUBLIC 176 (1985). 
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strengthen the federal judiciary as a bulwark for property interests. 
He favored reorganization of the judiciary, and the creation of sepa-
rate circuit courts of appeal. Although this reform failed, Webster 
helped defeat legislative moves to restrict the authority of the 
Supreme Court to invalidate state laws. More profitably, he crafted 
portions of the Federal Crimes Act of 1825 to close gaps in the 
existing law. Webster's attempts to revamp federal judicial power 
were fueled by his distrust of the state courts. "From the state 
Courts nothing can be expected," he observed in 1823. "The vacil-
lating policy of our little petty states, leading to such frequent 
changes, in the organization of their Courts, & more frequent 
changes of the judges, forbids all hope of system, or consistency in 
adjudications." 
Political ambitions took a toll on Webster's practice. Busy in 
the Senate and planning a presidential race, in the 1830s Webster 
began to curtail his Supreme Court work. Litigants, however, con-
tinued to seek his assistance. Indeed, Webster's professional 
achievements are particularly striking in view of his pressing public 
commitments. He appears to have been a driven man. William 
Wirt, a prominent contemporary at the Supreme Court bar, pri-
vately declared: "Webster is as ambitious as Caesar. He will not be 
outdone by any man." 
I was disappointed by the absence of material on Webster's 
participation in Wheaton v. Peters (1834), the first copyright case 
heard by the Supreme Court. Wheaton was pivotal in shaping the 
evolution of intellectual property law in the new nation. The editor 
concluded that only fragmentary papers relating to this case sur-
vived. This decision seems questionable. A recent study of the 
Wheaton litigation indicates the availability of several important 
documents that bear on Webster's role. Of particular interest is the 
interplay between Webster and his client Wheaton, a noted legal 
scholar.5 
Nonetheless, scholars will find much of interest in this work. 
It reveals a good deal about Webster and the development of Amer-
ican law during the antebellum years. It is an outstanding scholarly 
achievement which deserves a wide audience. 
5. For a fine treatment of Wheaton v. Peters, see Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme 
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REV. 1291, 1351-86 (1985). 
